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“While it was not unusual for cities to fight desegregation, 
St. Louis is 
unique in that its 
last legal 
settlement 
regarding 
desegregation of 
public schools 
ended in 2011.
his qualitative study examines why 
         the conflict over school desegregation  
      lasted until 2011. Although the city of 
St. Louis took some steps to desegregate 
schools after the 1954 Brown v. Board of 
Education ruling, the city school board, 
citizens, and politicians engaged in nearly 
70 lega l ba t t les regard ing schoo l 
desegregation. While it was not unusual for 
ci t ies to fight desegregat ion, even 
extending the fights through the late 1970s, 
St. Louis is unique in that its last legal 
settlement regarding desegregation of 
public schools ended in 2011. Only the 
initial lawsuits were over desegregation 
itself. The majority of desegregation legal 
battles in St. Louis regarded funding. The 
state had been mandated to pay half of the 
total costs of the desegregation program 
and the federal government was going to 
pay the rest. Politicians like John Ashcroft 
and Mel Carnahan waged war in court to try 
to prevent the hefty financial burden of 
desegregation from fal l ing on their 
shoulders. This paper attempts to prove 
that financial conflicts were the culprit in the 
long term fight against desegregation in St. 
Louis. Questions that guided this research 
include: Why did school desegregation take 
so long in St. Louis? Who were the key 
actors involved in school desegregation in 
St. Louis? How much did the program cost 
and how was the money allocated?
LITERATURE REVIEW
Amy Stuart Wells has written 
extensively about school desegregation in 
St. Louis. In Stepping Over the Color Line: 
African American Students in White 
Suburban Schools, she and Robert L. Crain 
argue that an invisible color line operates to 
determine where Americans live and attend 
school. The color line dictates much of 
people’s lives. This line is so deeply 
ingrained in American culture, that school 
desegregation could not undo it (Wells and 
Crain, 1997). My research draws upon this 
work. Both Sides Now: The Story of School 
Desegregation’s Graduates by Wells, 
Holme, Revilla, and Atanda interviewed over 
500 students from six schools in as many 
diﬀerent cities. In keeping with the theory 
that a color line divides Americans, Wells et 
al. found that even those who had positive 
experiences with desegregation were likely 
to live in segregated societies as adults 
(Wells, et al., 2009). Gary Orfield has also 
written extensively on school desegregation 
in St. Louis. His testimony during the Liddell 
T
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case is included in the archival records regarding St. 
Louis school desegregation. Orfield’s testimony 
helped determine how and why schools in St. Louis 
should desegregate. In addition, William Freivogel’s 
work shed light on the unique connection between 
Missouri’s history of the Dred Scott case and St. 
Louis’ resistance to school desegregation. Freivogel 
argues that the legacy of the Dred Scott case is proof 
that Missouri has a long and unique history of 
perpetuating injustices against blacks. The same state 
that ruled that a slave retained his status as property 
even when he lived in a free state was uniquely 
positioned to carry out further injustices against 
blacks (Freivogel, 2002). Finally, a key primary source 
for this research is Unending Struggle: The Long Road 
to an Equal Education in St. Louis. This book, written 
by Circuit Court Judge Gerald Heaney and Susan 
Uchitelle, the Director of the Voluntary Interdistrict 
Coordinating Committee for St. Louis schools, oﬀers 
a detailed look at the legal process of the 
desegregation of St. Louis schools. While this paper 
draws upon the literature of others, it hopes to add a 
new layer to the research. Rather than address the 
process of desegregation as Wells, Heaney, and 
Uchitelle do, or address the broad history of Missouri 
as Freivogel does, this paper attempts to connect the 
extended conflicts over school desegregation to 
funding for the program. While some questions remain 
about the exact amount spent on desegregation, it is 
clear that legal battles over who would pay for the 
program were numerous and long term. This paper 
seeks to address that issue.   
METHODOLOGY
This paper uses a historical method employing 
a qualitative design to uncover why St. Louis school 
desegregation took so long.  Much of the research for 
this paper was gathered through archival work. The 
University of Missouri, Columbia houses the entire 
volume of court transcripts from the original Liddell 
case and the nearly 66  cases that followed. The 
original Liddell v. Board of Education of the City of St. 
Louis case is used in this research in addition to the 
appeal that was heard in the Circuit Court. Civil Court 
documents provide a litigation history for St. Louis 
desegregation and Civil Dockets provide a detailed 
look at the interactions between plaintiﬀ and 
defendant in the Liddell case. School desegregation in 
St. Louis was covered, heavily, in local newspapers. 
As a result, several St. Louis newspaper articles are 
used to exp lore the responses to school 
desegregation and the legal cases that followed its 
implementation. These helped to determine the 
magnitude of the problem. In addition, politicians held 
press conferences to speak out against school 
desegregation. Other primary and secondary sources 
were used for this research. While there is more to be 
explored here; some of their statements were 
captured in newspapers. Little has been written on 
Minnie Liddell. Several smaller newspapers have 
written about her and provide a brief biography of the 
mother who started the process for school 
desegregation. In addition, Judge Gerald Heaney and 
Susan Uchitelle were key actors who left written 
records about their involvement in the case. Several 
memos sent between judges and other actors in this 
story provide useful insight. Finally, historians who 
have written about St. Louis school desegregation 
have left valuable secondary sources that help frame 
this work.“ Missouri has a long and unique history of perpetuating injustices against blacks.
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 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
St. Louis school desegregation has been well 
documented. Much of the research details the history 
of school desegregation in St. Louis, the legal 
proceedings and the quantitative results for students 
who participated in the program. In reading through 
court transcripts regarding the Liddell cases, it 
became clear that after the initial rulings, most of the 
cases and appeals filed were about funding the 
desegregation program, not the program itself. This 
paper attempts to show that much of the decades-
long conflict regarding school desegregation was 
about funding the program.
FINDINGS
Findings from this research reveal that the 
majority of appeals that resulted from this lawsuit 
dealt with whether or not the courts could force the 
city and state to pay for desegregation given that the 
schools were not found culpable of creating school 
segregation. District Court Judge, James Meredith 
ruled that while the school board did not create 
segregation in schools, it certainly contributed to it by 
utilizing policies that ensured segregation in schools 
and continued segregation practices that existed in 
the larger community (Liddell et al. v. St. Louis Board 
of Education. 469 F. Supp. 1304, 1979). The district 
court mandated that the state pay half of the cost of 
the program. Total costs of the program have been 
estimated at approximately $1.7 billion (Freivogel, 
2002, 209). The goal of the Voluntary Transfer 
Program was for suburban schools to increase their 
population of African American students by 15 
percentage points or reach a maximum capacity of 
25% African American students in suburban St. Louis 
schools (www.choicecorp.org). Even after St. Louis 
schools reached unitary status in 2008 and were able 
to elect out of the desegregation program, battles 
over the money still continued. The last financial 
settlement wasn’t paid until November 23, 2011 
(Volkmann, 2011).
Shift in Support for Funding Schools
From 1916 to 1969, St. Louis voters 
experienced a change in their support for school 
bond referendums. As white flight pushed whites 
farther away from predominately black areas in the 
city center, St. Louis was left with a population of 
mostly black voters who supported school bond 
referendums but did not have large earnings to 
support the increase in taxes. Whites, who earned 
more, often moved to the suburbs and those who 
remained in the city voted against having their taxes 
raised. In addition, blacks had relatively low voter 
turnout, so those who wanted to increase taxes to 
help fund the schools began to lose their voting 
power (Troen, 1977). From 1916 to 1947, every school 
bond issue that was proposed in St. Louis passed. In 
the 1950s, two of the eight bond issues failed. In the 
1960s, 14 out of 24 bond issues failed (Troen, 1977, 
p. 203). White flight had a marked eﬀect on St. Louis 
in the 1950s. Between 1960 and 1970, 34% of whites 
left St. Louis and moved to the suburbs. In that same 
time period, the black population of St. Louis 
increased from 29% to 41% (Troen, 1977, p. 204). 
The migration meant that middle class whites took 
their tax dollars with them the suburbs. Lower paid 
black families were left to fund public, city schools 
with less money. 
“The goal of the Voluntary Transfer Program was for suburban schools to increase their population of African American students by 15 percentage points or reach a maximum capacity of 
25% African American students in 
suburban St. Louis schools.
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By the time Judge Meredith issued his ruling 
that the St. Louis Board of Education must take 
aﬃrmative steps to desegregate, support for tax 
increases had long waned among St. Louis residents. 
Once the initial court ruling was handed down in 
1974, several dozen cases were filed regarding the 
financing of the program. Increasing taxes to fund 
public schools seemed to be almost as unsavory as 
desegregation itself.
Minnie Liddell
Minnie Liddell married at the age of 16 and 
she and her husband, Charles, had five children, 
Craton, Donna, Charles Jr., Brian and Michael. In 
1971, the Liddell’s lived on the predominately black, 
north side of St. Louis City. As a result of 
overcrowding in the black schools, Craton, his 
classmates, and his teacher were bused to a white, 
elementary school across town on the south side of
St. Louis. As an advocate for her children, Liddell and 
other parents lobbied the school board to build new 
schools on the north side of town. In 1972, the board 
agreed. All of Liddell’s children were assigned to 
attend the newly built Yeatman School in Liddell’s 
neighborhood when it opened.  Liddell reports that 
the school was immediately overcrowded (Heaney 
and Uchitelle, 2010).  In 1972, after only one year in 
attendance at Yeatman School, Minnie Liddell learned 
that her children were going to be transferred from 
the newly constructed Yeatman School to Bates 
School. It would have been Craton’s fourth school in 
five years. Bates was a black school that had been 
closed down because of its dilapidated condition 
(Personal Interview, quoted in Heaney and Uchitell, 
2010). The St. Louis School Board had decided to 
reopen the school as a cost eﬀective way to relieve 
overcrowding in neighborhood schools. In addition to 
Bates being in poor condition, it was far away from 
the Liddell’s neighborhood. Craton, who was twelve 
years old, was going to be bused from a wonderful, 
neighborhood school to a dilapidated school that was 
far from home. Minnie Liddell began lobbying her 
neighbors to complain. She organized a boycott and 
successfully had her son reassigned to Yeatman 
(Freivogel, 2003). Believing that St. Louis Public 
Schools was practicing de facto segregation, Liddell 
decided to sue anyway. The result was an estimated 
$1.5 billion interdistrict desegregation program and 
almost 70 legal battles that began in 1972 and ended 
in 2011 (Freivogel, 2003). Minnie Liddell believed that 
if you didn’t provide children with a quality education, 
“Each and every one of us is going to pay for 
it” (Singer, 1998, p. 1).Her words, ironically, became 
the sticking point for St. Louis politicians who spent 
more than 20 years arguing that the problem with 
school desegregation is that the state shouldn’t have 
to pay for it.
Liddell v Board of Education
In 1972, Minnie Liddell sued the St. Louis 
Board of Education on behalf of children in St. Louis 
who were being forced to attend segregated schools. 
In St. Louis, as in other cities, housing segregation 
led to school segregation. The 1967 Report of the 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights listed St. Louis as an 
example of “severe” residential segregation. While St. 
Louis schools had, by law, desegregated after the 
Brown ruling, housing communities remained 
segregated.  As a result, schools in St. Louis had not 
outwardly fought desegregation because housing 
segregation ensured that schools would remain, for 
the most part, segregated. Some city neighborhoods 
“ Minnie Liddell believed that if you didn’t provide children with a quality education, “Each and every one of us is going to pay for it.”
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were desegregated which meant that city schools, 
while predominately black, did have a white 
population. For example, in the 1972-1973 school 
year there were 181 elementary and high schools in in 
these fields that will also give them the background 
which black and white children attended together. 
County schools, however, remained more segregated. 
In a 1980, the St. Louis Post Dispatch reported that 
county schools had a practice of transporting black 
students who lived in suburban communities to black 
city schools (Liddell et al. vs. St. Louis Board of 
Education. 469 F. Supp. 1304, 1979).
 In the initial Liddell case, District Court Judge 
James Meredith found that housing segregation was 
a large factor in determining why schools were 
segregated. He couldn’t rule in favor of the plaintiﬀs 
because the burden of proof set my Milliken v. 
Bradley could not be placed on public schools 
(Milliken v. Bradley, 1977). Judge Meredith ruled that 
St. Louis schools hadn’t created the segregation 
problem. Housing segregation and other factors were 
responsible for school segregation. However, he did 
find that schools had to take action to remedy the 
problem. Judge Meredith’s ruling came in 1974. 
However, following his initial ruling, the courts were 
plagued with lawsuits regarding who would pay for 
school desegregation. It appeared that no one 
wanted to raise taxes to pay for busing, magnet 
schools, or desegregation programs.
     After the initial Liddell v Board of Education suit 
was filed and the District Court ruled that St. Louis 
Public Schools had to desegregate, a mass number 
of law suits followed concerning how to pay for the 
program. The estimated cost of desegregation was 
$1.5 billion and there was no plan to pay for the 
expensive program. Whether or not cost was the 
most significant objection St. Louisans had to school 
desegregation is undeterminable. It was, however, a 
major deterrent. After almost 70 legal battles that 
began in 1972, the school desegregation conflicts 
finally ended in 2011.
The Desegregation Plan
	 Attorney William Freivogel wrote extensively 
about the St. Louis desegregation program as a 
journalist for the St. Louis Post Dispatch. He outlined 
the five major components that school desegregation 
was supposed to address. The first major component 
was the voluntary transfer of students from city 
schools to suburban schools. While families could 
volunteer to participate, suburban schools could 
screen children for behavior problems and special 
education needs prior to accepting them into the 
program. The second component was the 
maintenance and creation of new magnet schools in 
St. Louis city. Magnet schools were supposed to 
provide a superior education for residents of the city. 
A proposal was made to open 10 new magnet 
schools and to encourage whites from the suburbs to 
transfer to city, magnet schools. The third component 
of the desegregation program was the promise for 
capital improvements to city schools.  Money was to 
be used to fix the infrastructure and develop new 
facilities and programs in city schools that served 
African American students. The fourth component of 
the desegregation program was the payment of the 
program. The state of Missouri would pay for the 
transfer of students from city to suburbs. The state 
would pay both the suburban host school for 
accepting the transfer students and pay the city 
school a smaller amount to make up for the loss of 
the student generated revenue. Wealthy districts, like 
Clayton Schools, that had a large per pupil spending 
amount prior to the desegregation program were 
given as much as $10,000 per pupil, per year 
(Freivogel, 202). Suburban schools, like the Bayless 
School District, that spent less per pupil were given 
$3,000 per pupil, per year (Freivogel, 202). Either way, 
the desegregation funding provided a financial 
impetus for suburban schools to accept Voluntary 
Transfer students into their schools. While the 
suburban schools had the most to gain financially, 
city schools were also provided payments as part of 
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the desegregation program. They were given the 
equivalent of nearly half of their typical per pupil 
spending for every student who left to go to a 
suburban school (Freivogel, 202). While city schools 
received less money than they would have in previous 
years, they were being given “shadow payments” for 
students who no longer attended their schools. With 
fewer students in the population, city schools could 
use their extra funds to develop new programs for the 
students who were left in their schools.  The final 
component of the desegregation program was the 
time limit that was set for its legal ramifications. 
Schools had a strong incentive to comply with the 
program. During the first five years of compliance, 
there would be a stay on the Interdistrict court case 
that had led to the creation of the program in the first 
place. If schools were found to be in compliance for 
five years, then the original lawsuit against the city 
would be dropped.
Immediate Resistance to St. Louis 
School Desegregation
 In January 1976, following the court ruling, 
objections to the desegregation plan were filed by the 
Missouri State Teachers’ Association and objections 
for the purpose of clarification were filed by the St. 
Louis Teachers’ Unions, Local 420, American 
Federation of Teachers. The teachers’ unions 
vehemently opposed the court’s decision regarding 
the hiring of teachers. In particular, they opposed the 
quotas that the court expected them to fill. The court 
wanted an increase in the number of minority 
teachers as a function of voluntary transfers, initially, 
but if enough teachers did not volunteer to meet the 
court’s quotas, then schools were expected to give 
mandatory transfers to teachers in order to meet the 
quotas. By the 1976-1977 school year, the court 
wanted an increase in hiring, so that minority 
teachers represented 10% of the total population of 
teachers in the system. By the following school year, 
the increase was expected to reach 20% and for the 
1978-1979 school year, the court wanted a total of 
30% minority teachers working in St. Louis public 
schools (Heaney and Uchitelle, 2004; Liddell v. St. 
Louis Board of Education, 1979). The appeal was 
heard by the 8th Circuit Court and the union, and the 
Board of Education was oﬀered an opportunity to 
create an alternative plan that would eﬀectively 
support school desegregation.
 Opposition to the voluntary desegregation 
began almost immediately and showed up on the 
front page of the newspapers. On February 2, 1981, 
seven suburban school superintendents published an
open letter in the St. Louis Post Dispatch calling the 
program “impossible” (Voluntary Integration Plan By 
State Called Impossible, 1981). The superintendents
represented Riverview Gardens school district, 
Webster Groves school district, Hancock Place, 
Ladue, Rockwood, Brentwood and the Jennings 
schools districts. They argued that given the large 
number of city schools with 100% black populations, 
an integration program would require transfers that 
were too large to manage. They estimated that in 
order to achieve any rational desegregation, 15,000 
blacks would have to transfer from the city and 
15,000 whites would have to leave the suburbs to 
attend magnate schools (Voluntary Integration Plan 
By State Called Impossible, 1981). Edward T. “Tad” 
Foote, who was appointed by the District Court to 
head the desegregation Monitoring and Advisory 
Committee thought the superintendents were 
overreacting. In his estimation, desegregation could 
be achieved without such massive numbers of 
transfers, but it would require planning to implement
Opposition to the voluntary 
desegregation began almost 
immediately and showed up on 
the front page of the newspapers.“
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a workable program. He petitioned the court for a two 
month delay to continue planning (Eardley and 
Volland, 1981). Paul Rava, attorney for St. Louis 
School Board, suggested that county schools were 
simply delaying the desegregation process. He is 
reported in the St. Louis Post Dispatch as saying that
“the county districts have had at least 
nine months…but have delivered nothing 
more  than the acceptance of a single black 
student from the city and 27 country students 
enrolled in city “magnet” schools…There 
would have been a more tangible presence by 
now if the parties were seriously interested in 
cooperating” (Eardley and Volland, 1981, p. 1)
Wells reported that after five years, state oﬃcials 
were looking for ways out of the court ordered 
desegregation program. Missouri’s Assistant Attorney 
General, Michael Fields, expressed that cost was the 
reason the state wanted to control its own 
desegregation program, without court mandates.” 
The total cost for the first five years is expected to 
reach $500 million, and the state has begrudgingly
 footed most of the bill”. ''We're looking for a certain 
end point where the state's obligation for this 
extraordinary cost is over,'' said Fields (Wells, 1988, 
p. 4). After five years of following the court’s 
desegregation program, the state of Missouri was 
hoping to be granted ‘unitary’ status. In eﬀect, the 
court would determine that five years of the 
desegregation program had erased the eﬀects of 
school segregation. The state would no longer be 
held liable and would be released from court 
mandates to rectify the problem. Given that oﬃcials 
began the program by looking for a way out suggests 
that the financial lawsuits were just smoke in mirrors 
to cover up for the fact that politicians never fully 
supported desegregation.
Final Settlement Agreement
	 In 1999, a settlement agreement was reached 
among the federal government, the state of Missouri, 
and 16  suburban school districts that allowed for the 
creation of a $180 million fund for St. Louis Public 
Schools (SLPS) (Lippmann, 2011). The money would 
be held by the District Court and would be given to 
city schools when the students who transferred from 
suburban schools returned to city schools. The 
money was to be used for the purchase of land, the 
building of new schools, and upgrades to current city 
schools.
	 Deeply in debt, St. Louis Public Schools 
signed a legal agreement with the NAACP in 2003 
that allowed the school district to borrow $49.5 
million from the desegregation fund (Associated 
Press, 2003). The fact that the city public schools 
were deficient in funds speaks to the issue that the 
money reserved for public schools in the original 
settlement had never been received. The original 
intent was that the 50% per pupil spending that was 
given to city schools would be held by the court for 
capital improvements until the students who went to 
suburban schools returned. Since the students never 
returned from the suburbs, the money was never 
given to the schools. The 2010 request for this money 
proved to be the final legal hearing regarding St. 
Louis school desegregation.
 	 It remains unclear why the St. Louis Board of 
Education did not ask for the money in the decade 
following the 1999 settlement agreement. In 2010, the 
St. Louis School Board went to court to ask to 
receive the money that the courts had set aside for 
capital improvements. This final legal proceeding 
resulted in St. Louis Public Schools being given $96 
million that had been set aside for them as a result
Given that oﬃcials began the 
program by looking for a way out 
suggests that the financial 
lawsuits were just smoke in 
mirrors to cover up for the fact 
that politicians never fully 
supported desegregation.
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of the district court’s ruling decades earlier. 
Approximately, $20 remains in the fund. On 
November 16, 2011, St. Louis Public School 
Superintendent, Kelvin Adams, accepted the windfall 
of money that had been set aside for SLPS. The 
designation of the money is as follows: 
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